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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Several amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective
December 1, 2006. Rule 404,1 which governs the use of character
evidence offered to prove conduct, has been amended to clarify that
character evidence is generally not admissible in civil cases.2 Apparently at the behest of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice,
Rule 408,' which addresses the admissibility of evidence of conduct and
statements made in settlement negotiations, has been amended to
expand the use of settlement evidence in criminal cases.4 This change
will be particularly relevant to Eleventh Circuit criminal law practitioners in light of the court's decision in United States v. Arias,5 which was
discussed in last year's survey.' The logic of the proposed amendment
is questionable. First, statements made during settlement discussions,
accompanied as they often are by puffing and grandstanding, are
dubious evidence of fault. It is reasonable to question why those
statements would be more probative in a criminal case than in a civil
case. Second, the amendment to Rule 408 runs counter to Rule 408's
effort to further public policy favoring compromise.

* Partner in the firm of Adams, Jordan & Treadwell, P.C., Macon, Georgia. Valdosta
State University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D.,
cum laude, 1981). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. FED. R. EVrD. 404.
2. FED. R. EVID. 404(a); see also FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note (2006
Amendment).
3. FED. R. EVID. 408.
4. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note (2006 Amendment).
5. 431 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005).
6. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 1083, 1095-96 (2006).
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Rule 606(b) v broadly bars the admission of jurors' testimony about
their verdicts.'
The previous version of Rule 606(b) provided two
exceptions:
jurors could testify regarding "extraneous prejudicial
information . . . improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether
any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror."9
Amended Rule 606 now contains a third exception, which allows jurors
to testify on the issue of "whether there was a mistake in entering the
verdict onto the verdict form." 10
Rule 609" governs the use of convictions to impeach a witness's
credibility. Prior to the amendment of Rule 609, a witness could be
impeached with a conviction if the crime "involved dishonesty or false
statement." 2 Amended Rule 609 permits the admission of a conviction
to impeach a witness's credibility "if it readily can be determined that
establishing the elements of the crime required proof or admission of an
act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness.""8 Although the
difference in language is subtle, the amendment purports to resolve a
conflict among the circuits regarding how to determine whether a
conviction involves dishonesty or false statement. 4 Specifically, the
conflict is whether, in determining if the offense involves dishonesty or
false statement, the court is limited to examination of the strict elements
of the crime. 5 Amended Rule 609(a)(2) makes clear that courts are not
so limited.
The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules has proposed a new rule,
Rule 502,16 regarding waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 7 This
proposed rule was discussed in last year's survey," but it has been
substantially revised since then. 9
Revised proposed Rule 502(a)

7. FED. R. EviD. 606(b).
8. Id.
9. FED. R. EviD. 606(b), 28 U.S.C. app. at 695 (2000) (amended 2006).
10. FED. R. EvID. 606(b).
11. FED. R. EvID. 609.
12. FED. R. EviD. 609(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. app. at 768 (2000) (amended 2006).
13. FED. R. EviD. 609(a)(2).
14. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, available at
www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/EVMayO4.pdf#page+22 (last visited May 13, 2007).
15. Id.
16. FED. R. EVID. 502.
17. U.S. Courts, Federal Rulemaking, available at www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrulesl.
html (last visited May 13, 2007).
18. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 1083, 1086 (2006).
19. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, available at
www.uscourts.gov/rules/ExcerptEVReportPub.pdf (last visited May 13, 2007).
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provides that "the waiver by disclosure of an attorney-client privilege or
work product protection extends to an undisclosed communication or
information concerning the same subject matter only if that undisclosed
communication or information ought in fairness to be considered with
the disclosed communication or information."20 Subdivision (b) provides
that an inadvertent disclosure does not constitute a waiver "if the holder
of the privilege or work product protection took reasonable precautions
to prevent disclosure and took reasonably prompt measures, once the
holder knew or should have known of the disclosure, to rectify the error
"21
Subdivision (c), titled "Selective waiver," may well excite the most
comment and controversy because it can be argued that the rule will
unnecessarily erode the attorney-client privilege.
Subdivision (c)
provides that disclosure of privileged information "to a federal public
office or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or
enforcement authority-does not operate as a waiver of the privilege or
protection in favor of non-governmental persons or entities."22 Thus,
a client can disclose privileged communications to a governmental
agency without waiving the attorney-client privilege as to other parties
or entities. The concern is that an across-the-board selective waiver rule
will make it difficult for clients facing possible prosecution to resist the
government's request for a grant of selective waiver. To the extent that
the selective waiver rule facilitates the ability of investigators to obtain
privileged information, clients' confidence that their communications
with their attorneys are privileged will be diminished. The harm is
exacerbated by the fact that the Rule does not bar the government from
sharing the information it obtains pursuant to a selective waiver with
other entities.
Subdivision (d) makes clear that information disclosed in accordance
with a confidentiality order does not constitute a waiver both as to
parties and nonparties to the action.23 Subdivision (e), on the other
hand, provides that agreements between or among parties concerning
nonwaiver, while binding on the parties to the agreement, are not
binding on nonparties unless the agreement is approved by the court. 24
For example, if during the course of a deposition the parties agree that
a witness can testify about a particular matter and that his testimony
will not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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product protection, the parties presumably would have to stop the
deposition and get court approval of the agreement if they want their
agreement to apply to nonparties.

II.

ARTICLE

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Federal Rule of Evidence 10325 provides that an appealing party
cannot complain about a district court's erroneous evidentiary rulings
unless that party objected to the admission of the evidence or, in the
case of a ruling excluding evidence, made an offer of proof-that is,
informed the district court of the substance of the excluded evidence."
Though easily stated, Rule 103 does not address every situation in which
parties may sometimes find themselves. For example, if a district court
rules that the prosecution can impeach the defendant with evidence of
a prior conviction if the defendant testifies, then that defendant, for
tactical reasons, might not take the stand. In that event, the conviction
would not be admitted. But what if the defendant, after being convicted,
wants to appeal the district court's decision to admit evidence of the
conviction, arguing that the ruling erroneously prevented him from
testifying? Addressing this situation in Luce v. United States,27 the
United States Supreme Court held that a pretrial ruling permitting the
admission of prior conviction evidence under Rule 609 if the defendant
testifies is not reviewable if the defendant does not, in fact, testify.2
In United States v. Hall,2 9 discussed in a prior survey," the Eleventh Circuit applied Luce to evidence ruled admissible under Rule
404(b).3 ' In Hall, a child pornography case, the district court ruled
that a videotaped interview of a four-year-old girl who said that the
defendant had engaged in sexual conduct with her was admissible
pursuant to Rule 404(b) to demonstrate the defendant's intent,
knowledge, and lack of mistake or accident. Weighing the benefit of
raising those defenses against the horrific prejudice if jurors saw the
videotape, the defendant chose not to put up any evidence, stipulating
that he would not raise defenses such as intent or mistake. After his
conviction, the defendant sought to appeal the district court's order that
the tape could be admitted at trial.3 2 Applying Luce, the Eleventh

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

FED. R. EVID. 103.
FED. R. EvID. 103(a).
469 U.S. 38 (1984).
Id. at 43.
312 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2002).
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1487, 1490-91 (2003).
Hall, 312 F.3d at 1256-57; FED. R. EviD 404(b).
Hall, 312 F.3d at 1252-55.
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Circuit held that the defendant could not appeal that ruling because the
tape was never admitted."
During the current survey period, the Eleventh Circuit in United
States v.LeCroy 34 applied Luce in the context of trial court rulings
involving the admissibility of expert testimony.3 After his conviction,
and during the sentencing phase of his trial, the defendant sought to
offer opinion testimony regarding his mental health. The district court
ruled that if the defendant presented this testimony, the prosecution
would be allowed to present rebuttal evidence, including an evaluation
of the defendant's mental status prepared by a government expert. This
evaluation had been sealed, but the defendant's attorney had been
allowed to examine the report. Apparently, the defendant's attorney was
so concerned about the content of the report that he elected not to
introduce the opinion testimony of his experts. The defendant then
sought to appeal the district court's ruling that the government could
introduce its expert's report if the defendant presented opinion
testimony.36
Applying Luce, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
defendant had nothing to appeal. 37 Because the defendant's experts did
not testify and the government's expert report was not admitted, the
court reasoned that it would be required to speculate twice: once as to
the testimony of the defendant's experts and again with regard to the
testimony of the government's expert. 38 Accordingly, "[iut would be
improper for this court to engage in such speculation, and thus we
decline to reach the merits of this issue.

III. ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
Rule 40340 allows a district court, under some circumstances, to
exclude relevant evidence, most notably when the danger of unfair
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. 4'
When the Author first began surveying Eleventh Circuit evidentiary
decisions in 1986, Rule 403 was fertile ground for appeals and the
Eleventh Circuit did not hesitate to immerse itself deeply in minute
factual examinations to determine whether district courts properly

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1258.
441 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 928.
Id. at 927-28.
Id. at 928.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
Id.
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admitted or excluded evidence. Most frequently, the Eleventh Circuit
employed Rule 403 to reverse convictions in criminal cases on the ground
that prejudicial evidence should not have been admitted. In recent
years, however, Rule 403 is rarely a factor in Eleventh Circuit decisions,
and when it is mentioned, it is hardly the tool for rigid scrutiny it once
was.
Nevertheless, as reported in the 2003 survey,42 the Eleventh Circuit
in United States u. Jernigan41 came close to ruling that a defendant's
conviction should be reversed because the trial court admitted evidence
that the defendant was a member of a gang.4
The court stated,
"Indeed, modern American street gangs are properly associated with a
wealth of criminal behavior and social ills, and an individual's membership in such an organization is likely to promote strong antipathy in a
jury."45 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit could not quite bring itself
to hold that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted
evidence of gang membership. 46 During the current survey period, the
47
Eleventh Circuit turned to this issue in United States v. Bradberry.
In Bradberry the defendant, who had been convicted of possessing a
firearm in a school zone, contended that the district court abused its
discretion when it admitted evidence that he was a gang member.'
The government contended that the defendant and fellow gang members
went to the school with a firearm to retaliate for an earlier incident.49
The defendant contended that there was no evidence that he was a
member of a gang and that evidence that his alleged companions were
gang members was used simply to establish his guilt by association.5 °
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the inherent prejudice, as recognized
in Jernigan,of evidence of gang membership and seemed to acknowledge
that evidence of the defendant's membership in a gang was scant.5'
The court stated that "[t]he implicationof the government's questioning
regarding the Maysville soldiers was that the [defendant and his
companions] were all members of the gang."5 2 However, to the extent
that there was evidence that the group was in the same gang, that

42. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 55
43. 361 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2003).
44. Id. at 1285.
45. Id. at 1284-85.
46. Id. at 1285.
47. 466 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2006).
48. Id. at 1251.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1253-54.
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis added).

MERCER

L. REV. 1219, 1221 (2004).
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evidence made the government's theory of the case more likely.5" Thus,
the evidence did not only suggest that the defendant was a bad person
or that because he was a gang member he was more likely to possess a
gun, but rather the evidence of his gang membership helped explain why
the defendant and his companions were at the school together.54
As in Jernigan,the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that evidence of
gang membership in this case was a "close question." 5 The Eleventh
Circuit thus concluded, as it did in Jernigan, that precisely because it
was a close question, the district court, which had the opportunity to
weigh the evidence firsthand, should be afforded broad discretion in
determining whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial impact.5 6 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
defendant's conviction.5 v
Rule 40458 is the primary rule of evidence addressing the admissibility of "extrinsic act evidence," or evidence of acts and transactions other
than the one at issue.59 Rule 404(b) prohibits the introduction of
evidence of prior misconduct offered to prove that a party is more likely
to have committed the charged offense or engaged in the conduct at
issue because of that prior misconduct.'
Such inadmissible evidence
is often called "propensity evidence.""' The Eleventh Circuit applies a
three-part test, sometimes called the Beechum test, to determine the
admissibility of extrinsic act evidence. 2
First, the extrinsic act
evidence "must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant's
character."6"
Second, the prosecution must prove the defendant
committed the extrinsic act.' Third, the evidence must survive a Rule
403 balancing test: the probative value of the extrinsic act evidence
must not be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.65 Rule
404(b) specifically provides that extrinsic act evidence may be admissible

53. Id. at 1254.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. FED. R. EvID. 404.
59. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
60. Id.
61. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1273, 1276 (2005).
62. United States v. Mills, 138 F.3d 928, 935 (11th Cir. 1998); see United States v.
Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
63. Mills, 138 F.3d at 935.

64. Id.
65.

Id.
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to prove66such matters as motive, preparation, knowledge, intent, scheme,
or plan.

Perhaps most frequently, the basis for admitting extrinsic act evidence
is that the evidence is relevant to prove intent. For example, prosecutors may contend that evidence of prior drug dealing is admissible to
prove a defendant's intent to participate in a subsequent drug conspiracy. To avoid the highly prejudicial impact of extrinsic act evidence,
defendants often try to eliminate the predicate for the admission of the
evidence. For example, defendants may contend that intent is not at
issue, and consequently evidence of a prior conviction is not necessary
to prove intent. As discussed in last year's survey,67 this argument met
with only fleeting success in United States v. Matthews."'
In an initial decision, the Eleventh Circuit in Matthews held that in
some circumstances, intent is not a legitimate issue.' 9 The court
stated, "Put simply, if the conduct charged is not open to a plausible
innocent explanation, then extrinsic offense evidence is not admissible
to show intent."7" This holding appeared to constitute a dramatic shift
in course by the Eleventh Circuit, but as noted, the change in course was
remarkably short-lived. In a second panel decision, the Eleventh Circuit,
in a terse opinion, held that a not guilty plea in a drug conspiracy case
makes the defendant's intent a material issue.71 Thus, at least in drug
conspiracy cases, a defendant necessarily makes an issue of intent, and
thus subjects himself to the admission of evidence of prior drug dealings,
if the defendant pleads not guilty.
In the current survey period, the Eleventh Circuit returned to this
issue in United States v. Perez.72 In Perez the defendant, who had been
charged with smuggling illegal aliens into the United States, objected to
the admission of a prior conviction for alien smuggling.73 However, the
Eleventh Circuit held that by pleading not guilty to participating in a
conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens, the defendant made intent a
material issue.7 4 Consequently, evidence of the defendant's prior
conviction was relevant to an issue other than his character.75 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that the defendant had not "'affirmatively take[n]

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 1083, 1092 (2006).
411 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1228.
Id.
United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005).
443 F.3d 772 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 774.
Id. at 779.
Id.
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the issue of intent out of contention by stipulating that [he] possessed
the requisite intent. ' "76 Of course, this is a Hopson's choice if there
ever was one; while such a stipulation may preclude the admission of the
prior conviction, it may also be tantamount to an admission of guilt. 77
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Kennard
illustrates the circumstances under which a defendant's flight can be
relevant to prove guilt and, in the process, demonstrates that the
Eleventh Circuit is not above employing wry humor to make a point. In
Kennard the defendant and his brother were charged with defrauding
churches and other charitable organizations of millions of dollars by
soliciting relatively nominal fees in exchange for promises of hundreds
of thousands of dollars in grants that were to be distributed to the
contributors. When the plan went awry and the defendant was indicted,
the defendant eluded authorities for several weeks.
At his trial, the district court admitted evidence of the defendant's
flight. After his conviction, the defendant appealed, contending among
other things, that the evidence of his flight was too prejudicial to be
admissible. 78 The defendant's argument, the Eleventh Circuit mused,
seemed to be that the evidence was "truly prejudicial because it made
[the defendant] look so guilty," to which the Eleventh Circuit responded:
"olf course it did."79 To make its point, the court borrowed from the
Bible: "'[tihe wicked flee when no man pursueth,' [but] they really flee
when law enforcement is looking for them."" That, the court continued, is precisely the reason evidence of flight is admissible; it is highly
probative of guilt. 1 While this evidence is extremely prejudicial, it is
prejudicial because it is so probative, not because it unfairly prejudices
the defendant.82 Therefore, the court concluded that the district court
properly admitted evidence of the defendant's flight.8 3
IV.

ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES

In United States v. Adair,8 4 the Eleventh Circuit held that if a
defendant calls witnesses to testify to a relevant trait of his character,
those witnesses are subject to cross-examination about the defendant's

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. (quoting United States v. Costa, 947 F.2d 919, 925 (11th Cir. 1991)).
472 F.3d 851 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 853-54.
Id. at 855.
Id. (quoting Proverbs 28:1 (King James)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
951 F.2d 316 (11th Cir. 1992).
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prior conduct pertinent to the character trait in issue.85 Such questions
are sometimes referred to as "have you heard" questions because the
prosecution is allowed to ask a character witness if he has heard that,
for example, a defendant was convicted of a prior criminal offense.86
During the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the limits of
"have you heard" questions in United States v. Ndiaye.
In Ndiaye, the defendant called three character witnesses who
apparently testified to the defendant's character for truthfulness.88 The
government then cross-examined each of the defendant's character
witnesses about a letter the defendant wrote to a neighbor seeking to
establish an amorous relationship.89 On appeal, the defendant contended that because his character witness had only testified about the
defendant's character for truthfulness, the government should not have
cross-examined those witnesses about alleged infidelity. 0 The government argued that the defendant's attempt to engage in a relationship
with a woman who was not his wife was, in fact, relevant to his
character for honesty and truthfulness.9 The Eleventh Circuit rejected
the government's argument.9" While the letter could possibly suggest
that the defendant "was not being entirely candid with his wife, it does
not directly relate to the [defendant's] truthfulness and honesty."93
However, the court concluded that the error was harmless.94
V.

ARTICLE VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY

Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.95 once again figured
most prominently in Eleventh Circuit evidence decisions. In Daubert the
Supreme Court made district court judges gatekeepers with the assigned
task of keeping "junk science" out of courtrooms.9 6 In 2000, the
principles of Daubert were codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence.

85. Id. at 319.
86. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1209, 1217-18 (1993).
87. 434 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2006).
88. Id. at 1289. A defendant may offer evidence of a pertinent trait of character for
substantive purposes pursuant to Rule 404(a)(1). See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). Pursuant
to Rule 608(a), the credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence of his
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. See FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
89. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d at 1289.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1290.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
96. Id. at 589-90.
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Amended Rule 70117 makes clear that lay witnesses cannot give opinion
testimony based on "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702. "98 In other words, the reliability requirements imposed by Daubert on expert testimony cannot be avoided by
labeling a witness a lay witness. Amended Rule 702"9 basically codifies
Daubert and requires that expert testimony must be "based upon
sufficient facts or data," must be the "product of reliable principles and
methods," and those "principles and methods [must be applied] reliably
to the facts of the case."0 0 Amended Rule 703101 provides that facts
or data, although relied upon by an expert, cannot be disclosed to the
jury by the proponent of the testimony unless the court determines that
the probative value of the facts or data "in assisting the jury to evaluate2
" 10
the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
This year saw the continuation of the trend discussed in previous
surveys-a tendency to permit the expansion of expert testimony in
criminal cases, at least when offered by the prosecution, and a simultaneous tendency to restrict the use of expert testimony in civil cases.
Whether this represents a Daubert bias against civil plaintiffs and
criminal defendants is well beyond the scope of this survey. However,
it is beyond debate that, for whatever reason, criminal defendants and
civil plaintiffs do not fare well in Daubert decisions.
In United States v. Garcia,' the defendant contended that the
district court erroneously permitted the government's expert witness, a
Drug Enforcement Agency agent who testified as an expert on the
meaning of coded language used by drug dealers, to testify about the out
of court statement of one of the defendant's alleged coconspirators.' 4
Much of the agent's expert testimony was unremarkable and consistent
with relatively recent Eleventh Circuit decisions permitting law
enforcement agents to testify as experts with regard to code words used
by criminal defendants. The agent was on solid ground so long as he
testified that various terms were used as code words by drug conspirators on a common and frequent basis.'0° However, one code word for
cocaine---"t-shirt"-was apparently specific to the drug conspiracy in

97.

FED. R. EviD. 701.

98. Id.
99.

FED. R. EviD. 702.

100. Id.
101. FED. R. EVID. 703.
102. Id.
103. 447 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2006).
104. Id. at 1334.
105. Id. at 1334-35, 1336-37.
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which the defendant was alleged to have participated. °6 In fact, the
agent only learned that "t-shirt" meant cocaine when he interviewed a
cooperating coconspirator. Thus, the agent was allowed to testify as an
expert at trial that "t-shirt" meant cocaine when the sole basis for this
"opinion" was a statement made to the agent by a coconspirator. Not
surprisingly, the defendant contended on appeal that the coconspirator's
statement was inadmissible hearsay.' °7 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.'
The court noted that Rule 703 permits an expert witness to base his
opinion on information that is otherwise inadmissible and that
information can even be disclosed to the jury.' 9 Law enforcement
agents testifying as experts may reasonably rely upon information
obtained during the course of interviewing criminals."0 The Eleventh
Circuit held that this includes information obtained from a coconspirator
in the very conspiracy in which a defendant is charged."' Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the agent
had applied his expertise in relying on, among other sources, his
interview with [the coconspirator] to determine the meaning of coded
language. An experienced agent [... 1 by virtue "of his professional
knowledge and ability, [was] competent to judge for himself the
reliability of' statements made by an admitted drug trafficker in postarrest debriefings in forming an
expert opinion about the drug traffic2
kers' use of coded language.1

In United States v. Dulcio,"' the prosecution used law enforcement
agents to give both lay and expert opinions. First, the district court
permitted one agent to testify that individuals picking up shipments of
drugs generally are aware of the contents of the shipment.' 4 Although the defendants objected to this testimony on several grounds at
trial, on appeal they apparently only contended that the testimony
violated Rule 704(b) because the agents expressed an "'opinion or
inference as to whether the defendants did or did not have the mental

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
1971)).
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1333.
at 1334.
at 1336.
at 1336-37.
at 1337 (quoting United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.

441 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1273.
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state.. .constituting an element of the crime charged.""' 5 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that some courts have ruled that such
testimony violates Rule 704(b), but rather than discussing the defendants' contention, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that any error was
harmless." 6
Two other agents were allowed to give what the district court
considered lay opinion testimony regarding the modus operandi of people
involved in the drug business."I7 Another agent testified, again as a
lay witness, that "persons picking up a high value narcotics shipment
'knew what was in there.""'" It is not clear why this agent was giving
lay testimony while the other agent who testified about the knowledge
of people picking up drug shipments was giving expert testimony. In
any event, because Rule 704(b)'s prohibition against opinion testimony
about defendants' mental states or conditions applies only to expert
witnesses, the rule did not bar lay opinion testimony about the
defendants' states of
mind regarding the contents of a "high value
' 9
narcotics shipment. "
However, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the lay opinion testimony
of the two agents was based on specialized knowledge. 2 ' Thus, the
agents' testimony violated the prohibition of Rule 701(c), which prevents
lay witnesses from giving opinion testimony when their testimony is1
' 12
based on "'scientific, technical, or122 other specialized knowledge.
This error, however, was harmless.
A similar issue was raised in United States v. LeCroy. 23 In LeCroy
the defendant claimed that the prosecution and the district court
violated expert witness disclosure requirements when it allowed a
Georgia Bureau of Investigation ("GBI") agent to give opinion testimony.
The agent testified that a blood stain on a shirt appeared to have been
made by someone wiping a bloody knife on the shirt. Although the
prosecution did not disclose the GBI agent as an expert, the district
court allowed him to testify as a lay witness. 124 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed. 125 To the Eleventh Circuit, testimony that a blood stain was

115.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 704(b)).
Id. at 1273-74.
Id. at 1274.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1275.
Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701(c)).
Id.
441 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 926-27.
Id.
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made by a knife being wiped on the shirt clearly did not constitute
expert opinion under Rule 702.125 Rather, it was an opinion "'rationally based on the perception of the witness [...] helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue,
and [...
not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. ' "117 Although the agent's
experience and qualifications may have qualified him as an expert
witness, that did not make the agent's opinion testimony expert opinion
testimony. 128
This issue was raised yet again in United States v. Hamaker.'2 9 In
Hamaker the prosecution again failed to identify a government agent,
this time an FBI financial analyst, as an expert witness. The government then called the agent to give opinion testimony based on his review
of financial records. The district court permitted the analyst to testify
as a lay witness.'
Carefully examining the analyst's testimony, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that he did not testify as an expert. 3 1 The
analyst
simply added and subtracted numbers from a long catalog of...
records, and then compared those numbers in a straightforward
fashion. As [the analyst] himself explained at trial, while his expertise
and the use of computer software may have made him more efficient
at reviewing [the] records, his review itself was within the capacity of
any reasonable lay person.3 2
Therefore, the analyst's testimony was permissible lay testimony.'3 3
For those looking for support for the argument that the Eleventh
Circuit applies Daubert differently in civil cases than in criminal cases,
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Thomas v. Evenflo Co.'"4 may be
instructive. As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit held in United

126. Id.
127. Id. at 927 (quoting FED. R. EviD. 701).
128.

Id.

129. 455 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006).
130. Id. at 1330-31. The district court did exclude summary charts that the
government intended to use to bolster the analyst's testimony because those charts were
not produced until the morning of the first day of trial. Id. at 1330. The district court
stated, "'[Hiow can there be a fair trial for the defendant if the defense attorney is not
given a key exhibit prior to the morning of trial?'" Id. No doubt, the defendant asked the
same question about the government's failure to identify the analyst as an expert witness
and to disclose the substance of, and bases for, his opinion testimony.
131. Id. at 1331-32.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1332.
134. 205 F. App'x 768 (11th Cir. 2006).
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35
that a prosecution expert could give opinion testiStates v. Garcia'
mony even though the opinion was based on the hearsay statement of
In Thomas the personal
the defendant's alleged coconspirator. 136
representative of an infant's estate brought suit against the manufacturer of the infant car seat in which the child, J.T., was sitting when he
asphyxiated. The plaintiff contended, for several reasons, that the seat
was defective and proximately caused the infant's death. The plaintiff
retained an expert, a consulting engineer, who rendered several opinions
regarding defects in the car seat,13 7 only one of which will be discussed
here.
In that opinion, the expert stated in his report as follows: "One side
of the harness became disengaged and [J.T.] moved such that he had
both of his legs on one side of the crotch strap. His body slid forward
causing the harness tie to load against his neck. This loading resulted
in his asphyxiation. " 13 8 The district court struck this opinion on the
grounds that it was unreliable because the plaintiff had not sufficiently
established the methodology used by the expert or whether the expert
correctly applied methodologies referenced in articles he had attached to
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, but on different
his report. 139
grounds.14 ° The Eleventh Circuit observed "reasons more fundamental
to the principles governing the admissibility of evidence in the federal
Specifically,
courts" to conclude that the opinion was inadmissible.'
the opinion was not based on the expert's personal knowledge and
therefore was inadmissible under Rule 602,142 which requires that a
witness have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies."
The Eleventh Circuit also generally cited Rules 801 through 807,1"
which, of course, address hearsay. 48
However, the opinion acknowledges that the expert's knowledge was
based on photographs of the scene, deposition testimony, an autopsy
report, and discovery responses.'4 6 Perhaps there are facts missing
from the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, but it is difficult to understand why

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

447 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1336-37.
Thomas, 205 F. App'x at 769-70.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 772.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. EvID. 602.
Thomas, 205 F. App'x at 772.
FED. R. EvID. 801 to 807.
Thomas, 205 F. App'x at 772.
Id.
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the Eleventh Circuit did not acknowledge or address, as it did in Garcia,
Rule 703, which allows experts to give testimony based on facts proved
by others or even inadmissible hearsay.'4 7
Moreover, the court continued, the expert's "recitation of the circumstances of J.T.'s death would have been cumulative and therefore would
not have assisted the trier of fact. In fact, the suggestion of [the
expert's] presence at the incident would be misleading and unduly
persuasive."' 4 Again, perhaps there is something missing from the
opinion. It would seem highly unlikely that the plaintiff was suggesting
that his expert was present when the infant died. Rather, the expert
was attempting to offer an opinion, based on facts provided to him,
regarding how the infant
was able to move his body in a fashion that
1 49
resulted in his death.

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held that the expert's opinion that the
infant asphyxiated when his body slipped forward "causing the harness
tie to load against his neck" was inadmissible because nothing in the
expert's qualifications made him qualified to render such an opinion.5 0
Although the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that medical training is not
necessary to offer an opinion as to cause of death, the court nevertheless
held that the opinion was inadmissible because the opinion "could have
been premised only upon information elsewhere available to the trier of
fact, who would be free to draw similar or differing conclusions based
upon the same evidence." 1 ' Therefore, for reasons not even based on
Daubert, but quite frankly for reasons that are difficult to1 understand,
2
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.
VI. ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY
As first discussed in the 2005 Georgia Evidence survey,5 3 the
Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington5 4 overruled Ohio v.
Roberts.5 and held that out of court "testimonial" statements are not
admissible at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant
had prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.5 6 In Crawford

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

FED. R. EvID. 703; Garcia, 447 F.3d at 1336-37.
Thomas, 205 F. App'x at 772 (citing FED. R. EVID. 403).
See id. at 770-72.
Id. at 770, 772-73.
Id. at 773.
Id.
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 213 (2005).
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Id. at 68-69.
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the defendant contended that the trial court improperly allowed the jury
to hear his wife's tape-recorded statement to police officers, which the
prosecution tendered after the wife invoked her spousal privilege and
thus was unavailable to testify.157 The trial court and the Washington
Supreme Court held that the circumstances surrounding the statement
were sufficiently reliable to overcome the defendant's argument that the
admission of the out of court statement violated his Sixth Amendment 58 right of confrontation, accepting the prosecution's argument
that under the Supreme Court's decision in Roberts, hearsay statements
are admissible if the statements fall within a "'firmly rooted hearsay
exception'" or if they bear "'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.'"' 5 9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Crawford and held that the Sixth Amendment applies to out of court
testimonial statements. 6 ° Testimonial statements include affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony, and "similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.""6'
Subsequent decisions in both state and federal courts attempting to
interpret Crawfordhave largely focused on what constitutes a testimonial statement.
In United States v. Underwood,' the district court admitted
recorded conversations between the defendant's brother and a confidential informant during the defendant's trial for alleged possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute. The district court ruled that the
statements were statements of a coconspirator and thus admissible
pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence." The
Eleventh Circuit easily concluded that the brother's statement was, in
fact, a statement by a coconspirator made during the course of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy and thus was admissible under Rule
The court took a little more time to examine the
801(d)(2)(E). 1
defendant's contention that the statement was inadmissible pursuant to
Crawford. The court agreed that even though a statement may meet the
elements of the coconspirator exception,
65 it is inadmissible under
Crawford if the statement is testimonial.

157. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38-42.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
159. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 42, 68.
Id. at 51.
446 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2006).

163. Id. at 1345; FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
164.
165.

Underwood, 446 F.3d at 1345-46.
Id. at 1346.
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Examining the examples of testimonial statements given by the
Supreme Court in Crawford, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
Second Circuit, noting that "all of these formulations involve statements
made under circumstances which would lead the declarant to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." 66 The
challenged statements consisted of conversations between the brother
and the confidential informant regarding the purchase of cocaine.' 67
These statements "clearly were not made under circumstances which
would have led [the brother] reasonably to believe that his statement
would be available for use at a later trial."'6 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit noted that in Crawford the Supreme Court established,
albeit in dicta, that most "'hearsay exceptions covered statements that
by their nature were not testimonial-for example, business records or
statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.'"' 9
Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the brother's statement was not testimonial
in nature and therefore Crawford did not apply. 7 '
In Espy v. Massac,'7 ' the Eleventh Circuit addressed for the first
time the issue of whether Crawford applies retroactively. In Espy, a
habeas action, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery in state
court. In the state court trial, the trial court admitted, pursuant to the
resgestae exception, statements made by two witnesses to a police officer
approximately fifteen to twenty minutes after the robbery.'72 These
were precisely the type of testimonial statements that Crawford
intended to address. However, the defendant's state court trial took
place prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford, and therefore,
the court of appeals had to address whether Crawford applied retroactively.'

166. Id. at 1347 (citing United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2004)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55).
170. Id. at 1347-48. See also United States v. Brown, in which the Eleventh Circuit
held as nontestimonial a private telephone conversation between the defendant and his
mother during which the mother, apparently based on statements made to her by her son
during the telephone conversation, made statements that were overheard and which
suggested that the defendant had just told his mother that he had committed the crime
with which he was charged. 441 F.3d 1330, 1359-60 (11th Cir. 2006). The Eleventh Circuit
held that a "private telephone conversation between mother and son, which occurred while
[the mother] was sitting at her dining room table with only her family members present,
was not testimonial." Id. at 1360.
171. 443 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. 2006).
172. Id. at 1364.
173. Id. at 1365-66.
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The test for determining whether a court's decision applies retroactively is found in Teague v. Lane.174 The first element of the test is
whether the decision constitutes a new rule of law. 175 "A case establishes a new rule 'if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant's conviction became final.'"'176 Clearly, Crawford, which overruled Roberts, created a new rule of law.177 However,
the second element of Teague holds that a new rule of law should not be
applied retroactively unless "it either (1) immunizes certain private,
individual conduct from criminal regulation; or (2) 'requires the
observance of those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.'"'7 v Clearly, Crawford did not immunize conduct from
criminal regulation and therefore the first exception was not applica179
ble.
The second exception applies to "'watershed rules of criminal
procedure,.. . without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is
seriously diminished.'"'"8 The Eleventh Circuit could find no decision
since Teague that met the strict standard established by this exception
and noted that the Supreme Court has suggested only the decision of
Gideon v. Wainwright, 8' requiring assistance of counsel in felony
prosecutions, as the type of new rule that might meet the Teague
standard.'8 2 Compared to Gideon, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
while Crawford certainly impacts the accuracy of criminal convictions,
it was not a watershed rule."s Moreover, the court noted that other
circuits had concluded or suggested that Crawford cannot be applied
retroactively.'
Accordingly, the court held that the defendant could
not rely on Crawford.85 Thus, the determination of whether the
admission of the hearsay statements violated a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights had to be based on the law at the time of the
defendant's trial.'86
Prior to Crawford, hearsay statements were

174. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
175. Espy, 443 F.3d at 1366 (citing McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1256 (11th
Cir. 2001)).
176. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301).
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 307).
179. Id. at 1367.
180. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 313).
181. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
182. Espy, 443 F.3d at 1367.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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admissible if, generally, they fell within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. 187 Interestingly, the court held that Georgia's res gestae
doctrine was a firmly rooted hearsay exception, 188 a point with which
some may disagree.
Rule 804(b)(1)'8 9 provides that testimony from a prior civil proceeding is admissible in a criminal case if the declarant is unavailable and
the party against whom the testimony is offered in the criminal case
"had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination" in the prior proceeding. 9 ° In
United States v. Kennard,9 ' the defendants, during their trial for mail
fraud, money laundering, conspiracy, and other offenses, contended that
the district court improperly excluded from evidence the deposition
testimony that their former attorney gave in a Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") investigation. 92 As discussed above, the charges
against the defendants arose from a scheme in which the brothers
solicited payments from churches or similar organizations in exchange
for promises that the participants would receive hundreds of thousands
of dollars in grants. These grants, of course, never materialized. The
deposition was taken by the SEC during the course of civil proceedings
filed by the SEC against the defendants and their company.'9 3 The
Eleventh Circuit agreed that the former attorney was "unavailable"
because he had refused to testify at the defendants'
trial on the grounds
94
that his testimony could incriminate him.
However, because the prosecution did not participate in the deposition,
the defendants still had to establish that the SEC, when it deposed the
attorney, had motives similar to the government's motives in its
prosecution of the defendants. 98
The defendants argued that the
SEC's investigation overlapped the criminal charges, particularly with
regard to an escrow account set up by the attorney in which the
fraudulently obtained funds were deposited.'
But the Eleventh
197
Circuit concluded that the defendants had not met their burden.
Essentially, the defendants relied on the deposition transcript itself and

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1992)).
Id. at 1367-68.
FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1).
Id.
472 F.3d 851 (lth Cir. 2006).
Id. at 855.
Id. at 853-54.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 855-56.
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argued that the questions and answers were sufficient to establish that
the subject matter of the deposition was similar to the subject matter of
the criminal prosecution.19
Even accepting this similarity, however,
the Eleventh Circuit noted that there was no evidence of the SEC's
motive in questioning the attorney and certainly not sufficient evidence
to establish that the SEC's motive was similar to the prosecution's
motive.'99 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district
court had not abused its discretion when it refused to admit the
deposition. °°
In United States v. Arias-Izquierdo,20 1 six Cuban nationals were
convicted of various charges based on the hijacking of a domestic Cuban
airliner that had been forced to fly to Key West.2 °2 On appeal, the
defendants contended that the district court improperly admitted a
document prepared by Cubana Airlines that revealed that five of the
defendants had previously been passengers on the flight that they later
commandeered. The document simply listed the flights the defendants
had taken on Cubana Airlines in 2003.203 The document was authenticated at trial by means of a separate document entitled "Certification of
Foreign Commercial Registries."2 °4 This contained a foreign records
certification, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 902(12),206 certifying that the attached documents "were prepared on or about the day
that the event transpired, by persons with knowledge and in the
ordinary course of business."2 " The certification further stated that
the airline maintained handwritten records documenting the passengers
on its flights. Thus, the document was actually a summary or recitation
of information contained in records maintained by the airline. These
records were not produced at trial.0 7 The government argued that the
document was admissible pursuant to Rule 803(6), ° s the business
records exception. 20 9
The district court agreed, finding that the

198.

Id. at 856.

199.

Id. at 855-56.

200.
201.
202.

Id. at 856.
449 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1173.

203. Id. at 1182-83.
204. Id. at 1183.
205. FED. R. EvID. 902(12).
206. Arias-Izquierdo, 449 F.3d at 1183.

207.

Id.

208. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
209. Arias-Izquierdo, 449 F.3d at 1183.
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document was a report or data compilation from the company's own
records and was thus admissible as a business record.21 °
On appeal, the defendants argued that the document was prepared for
litigation and thus could not have been a business record.2 ' The
Eleventh Circuit agreed; Rule 803(6) requires that records admitted
pursuant to the business records exception must have been maintained
in the ordinary course of business and not for litigation.2 12 The court
rejected the government's argument that although the trial exhibit was
prepared for litigation, it nevertheless was admissible as a business
record because it simply contained information found in records that
were maintained in the ordinary course of business. 2" The government argued that the summary was essentially the same as a computer
printout of digitally stored data, and such a document is admissible as
a business record. 21 4' The Eleventh Circuit did not accept this analogy.215 Rather than a simple computer printout, the court determined
the document was a typed summary of handwritten business records
prepared specifically for use at trial. 216 The exhibit simply was not a
business record."
However, the court held that the error was not
sufficiently prejudicial to reverse the defendants' convictions because
there was ample evidence to support
the charges even without the
21
erroneously admitted summary. 1
Prosecutors sometimes argue that hearsay is admissible to explain a
law enforcement officer's conduct. Georgia courts have firmly rejected
that argument on the grounds that it is only in the rarest of circumstances "that a prosecution will properly concern itself with why an
investigating officer did something." 219 Simply put, why a law enforcement officer does something is not relevant to the issue of whether a
defendant committed a crime.
During the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar
situation. In United States v. Arbolaez,2 2 ° the district court admitted
statements made by a nontestifying coconspirator to a Drug Enforcement

210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1183-84 (citing FED. R. EvID. 803(6)).
213. Id. at 1184.
214. Id.; see United States v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2002).
215. Arias-Izquierdo, 449 F.3d at 1184.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534, 536, 314 S.E.2d 910, 912 (1984); see also Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 55 MERCER L. REV. 249, 274 (2003).
220. 450 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2006).
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Administration agent. The agent testified that the coconspirator told
him that he had supplied the defendant with marijuana, that he had
obtained marijuana from the defendant, and various other things that
implicated the defendant.22 1 The district court admitted the testimony
as an "exception" to the hearsay rule-the testimony was not offered to
prove the truth of what the agent was told, "'but only that it was told to
him.'"22 2 The prosecution argued to the jury that the statements were
admitted to explain the agent's conduct after he heard them.223 The
Eleventh Circuit noted the district court's confusion over whether the
evidence was admissible as an "exception" to the hearsay rule or as
nonhearsay.22 4 It appeared to the Eleventh Circuit that the statements were actually admitted as nonhearsay pursuant to Rule 801(c) 225 because
they were not offered "to prove the truth of the matter
226
asserted."
Having determined the basis for the admission of the statements, the
Eleventh Circuit easily concluded that their admission constituted
error.227 With little elaboration, the court held that out of court
statements to explain why a law enforcement officer does something are
hearsay notwithstanding a contention that they are being offered to
prove why the law enforcement officer did something, that is, to explain
his conduct. 22' Although the Eleventh Circuit did not go so far, it is
likely that the rationale for its conclusion is identical to the Georgia
court's rationale for excluding such evidence; there is simply no need, in
determining whether a defendant committed a crime, to explain why an
investigating officer did something.

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 1289-90.
Id. at 1290.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
Arbolaez, 450 F.3d at 1290; FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
Arbolaez, 450 F.3d at 1290.
Id.

